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Attorney Jeff Landry Supports New Statute of Limitation Law Regarding Child Sex Abuse Crimes


Attorney General Jeff Landry

Jeff Landry, the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, issued a memorandum (see below) today to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, supporting the new Statute of Limitations law regarding child sex abuse crimes that was passed by the Governor earlier this year.

The case resides in Division E, Section 7 of the courts, and is in reference to the Case No. 2020-05419, “Harry T. Doe Versus Jesuit High School of New Orleans; US Central and Southern Province, Society of Jesus,” and was in response to the Peremptory Exception Pleading The Objection Of Prescription filed on the behalf of the defendants.

In the conclusion of Landry’s memorandum, he said “In the instant matter, the Attorney General urges this court to decline to hear the issue of constitutionality of Act 322, as it does not comport with jurisprudential requirements or statutory requirements for bringing a constitutional challenge. Jesuit has failed to meet the heavy burden necessary to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, Act 322 and La. 9:2800.9 should be upheld.”

What would seem to be a clear win for victims of childhood sex abuse in the state, which it is for Harry T. Doe, the memorandum does not apply to all such cases pending in the courts. However, it does send a clear signal as to Landry’s opinion and intent as to whether the new law is constitutional.

-ADVERTISEMENT-

Jillian Coburn, Board Member for Survivors of Childhood Sex Abuse (SCSA) said “We were initially elated about the new law being passed, only to be disappointed that the church would argue the constitutionality of the law.” She continued “The Louisiana Council of Bishops opposed the new law, but then the Archbishop of New Orleans, Gregory Aymond, who is the Chairman of the council, publicly said he supported the new law, and now the Jesuit order opposes it with the constitutionality argument – we wish they would make up their minds.”

In the past, these types of litigation tactics, moving priests around, and requiring the silence of their victims, the Catholic Church has been successful in exhausting the Statute of Limitations, but with Landry’s decision, it looks like it is further cemented as the law of the land.


CIVIL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS 

STATE OF LOUISIANA 

  1. 2020-05419 DIVISION E SECTION 7 

HARRY T. DOE 

VERUS 

JESUIT HIGH SCHOOL OF NEW ORLEANS; U.S CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN  PROVINCE, SOCIETY OF JESUS 

************************************************************** 

MEMORANDUM BY THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

IN RESPONSE TO THE PEREMPTORY EXCEPTION PLEADING THE OBJECTION  OF PRESCRIPTION FILED ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS 

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: 

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, comes Jeff Landry, in his official  capacity as Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, who respectfully submits this legal  memorandum for purposes of defending the constitutional challenge to Act 322 of 2021 and La.  R.S. 9:2800.9. 

BACKGROUND 

As the Attorney General’s office is not a party to the instant litigation, its knowledge of the  facts is limited to the pleadings it has received from the parties. Undersigned counsel understands  the facts to be as follows: In 2020, Harry T. Doe sued Jesuit for damages he claims he sustained  as a result of alleged sexual abuse by certain of defendants’ employees. The alleged abuse occurred  in the 1970s, when Mr. Doe was a minor. According to Mr. Doe’s petition, the abuse purportedly  took place both on and off the Jesuit High School campus and was committed by two janitors or  custodial workers employed by Jesuit High School. 

Jesuit filed a peremptory exception pleading the objection of prescription, contending that  Mr. Doe’s claims had prescribed pursuant to the one-year prescriptive period provided by La. C.C.  art. 3492. Jesuit also acknowledged the legislative changes that had occurred since the 1990s,  including La. C.C. art. 3496.1, which provided that an action against a person for abuse of a minor 

was subject to a liberative prescriptive period of three years, which “commences to run from the  day the minor attains majority.” In addition, the Louisiana Legislature enacted La. C.C. art.  3498.1,1 which provided that an action against a person for sexual abuse of a minor was subject to  a liberative prescriptive period of ten years that did not commence to run until the minor attained  majority and “is suspended for all purposes until the minor reaches the age of majority.” 

It appears undisputed that Mr. Doe’s claims were prescribed on their face; however, in his  initial opposition, Mr. Doe set forth several theories that purportedly defeated Jesuit’s exception  of prescription. Specifically, Mr. Doe proposed theories of (1) Fraudulent Concealment (contra  non valentem); (2) Continuing Tort; (3) Acknowledgment; (4) Renunciation; (5) Natural  Obligation; (6) Equity; and/or (7) Waiver.  

Thereafter, in June 2021, Mr. Doe filed a pleading entitled Plaintiff’s Motion and  Incorporated Memorandum to Strike Exception of Prescription and/or Opposition to Exception of  Prescription, in which he referenced Act 322 of 2021, which amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9(A)(1) to  provide that an action against a person for sexual abuse of a minor, or for physical abuse of a minor  resulting in permanent impairment or permanent physical injury or scarring, does not prescribe.2 Act 322 further provides for a revival, for a period of three years, of any claims against a party that  prescribed prior to the effective date of the Act.3 According to the plaintiff, because of the  provisions of Act 322, his claims against Jesuit have been revived to the extent that they had  already prescribed. 

Jesuit filed a memorandum in support of their earlier exception of prescription and in  opposition to the plaintiff’s motion to strike, setting forth several claims. As a preliminary matter,  Jesuit contend that Section 2 of Act 322 (the revival provision) does not apply to its exception of  prescription because: (1) the claims against Jesuit prescribed against separate law, not under §  9:2800.9—and thus, any “revival” of claims prescribed under § 9:2800.9 has no application to  this case; (2) Act 322 amended and narrowed the application of § 9:2800.9 such that, even if it  applied at all, it would not apply to Jesuit’s claims because (i) Jesuit had no duty to supervise a  non-student and (ii) the extension to “supervisory” entities has been amended out of the statute; (3) the revival provision confines itself to “parties” not persons, and thus is limited to natural  

  

1 La. C.C. art. 3498.1 was subsequently redesignated as La. R.S. 9:2800.9. 

2 2021 La. Acts No. 322, § 1, effective 6/14/2021. 

3 2021 La. Acts No. 322. § 2, effective 6/14/2021.

persons who are parties to the abuse; and (4) the revival provision does not apply to pending  litigation.  

In addition, Jesuit argues that the revival of Mr. Doe’s claim against it would be  unconstitutional. The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Justice and Attorney General  Jeff Landry in his official capacity, submits this memorandum solely on the issue of the  constitutionality of Act 322. This office takes no position of the rest of the issues raised by the  parties. 

LAW AND ARGUMENT 

  1. THE ISSUE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT 322 IS NOT PROPERLY  BEFORE THIS COURT. 
  2. The Constitutionality of a Statute Must Be Specially Pled and the Grounds for  the Claim Particularized. 

It is a long-standing jurisprudential rule of law that; 

[A] state statute must first be questioned in the trial court, not the appellate courts,  and the statute must be specially pleaded and the grounds for the claim  particularized. The pleadings allowed in civil actions are petitions, exception,  written motions and answers. Therefore, when the unconstitutionality of a statute  is specifically pled, the claim must be raised in a petition (the original petition, and  amended and supplemental petition or a petition in an incidental demand), and  exception, a motion or an answer. It cannot be raised in a memorandum, opposition  or brief as those documents do not constitute pleadings. 

Vallo v. Gayle Oil Company, Inc., 94-1238 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 859, 865 (internal citations  omitted). 

While there is no single procedure for attacking the constitutionality of a statute, the courts  have long held that the unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially pleaded and the grounds  for the claim particularized. State v. Schoening, 00-0903 (La. 10/17/03), 770 So.2d 762, 764  (citing Vallo, 646 So.2d at 864-865). The Supreme Court has expressed the challenger’s burden as  a three-step analysis. First, a party must raise the unconstitutionality in the trial court; second the  unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially pleaded; and third, the grounds outlining the basis  of unconstitutionality must be particularized. Vallo, 646 So.2d at 864-865.  

  1. Jesuit Failed to Particularize its Constitutional Claim. 

Jesuit raised the constitutional issue in its Second Amended Peremptory Exception of  Prescription. However, Jesuit failed to particularize their claim, as the exception merely states: 

In the alternative, the application of these amendments to Mr. Doe’s prescribed  claims against JHS would violate due process and would render the legislation (if  and as applied to JHS) an unconstitutional bill of attainder. JHS specifically submits 

that to apply these amendments to La. Rev. Stat. 9:2800.9 in a manner that would  revive Mr. Doe’s prescribed claims against JHS would be unconstitutional. 

The Supreme Court has thoroughly considered the standard for particularizing the  constitutional grounds. The purpose of particularizing the constitutional grounds is so that the  adjudicating court can analyze and interpret the language of the constitutional provision specified  by the challenger. State v. Expunged Record (No.) 249,044, 03-1940 (La. 7/2/04), 881 So.2d 104,  107 (citing Louisiana Mun. Ass’n v. State, 00-374 (La. 10/6/00), 773 So.2d 663, 667 (“In  adjudicating [a] constitutional challenge, the court must analyze and interpret the language of the  constitutional provision specified by the challenger.”)). This basic principle dictates that the party  challenging the constitutionality of a statute must cite to the specific provisions of the constitution  that prohibits the action. State v. Fleury, 01-0871 (La. 10/16/01), 799 So.2d 468, 472. 

Jesuit makes only the most general of references to the constitution, without providing any  citation to the specific provisions to the constitution that allegedly prohibit the enactment of Act  322. Furthermore, it is unclear from a reading of defendants’ pleading whether defendants are  challenging the constitutionality based on the United States Constitution or the Louisiana  Constitution or both. Therefore, the issue of constitutionality is not properly before this court. 

  1. STANDARD GOVERNING CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES A. Act 322 is presumed constitutional. 

To the extent that this Honorable Court finds that the issue of constitutionality is properly  before it, although the Office of the Attorney General maintains that it is not, Defendants have not  met the heavy burden of proving that the legislation at issue is unconstitutional. 

It is well-established that all statutory enactments are presumed constitutional and every  presumption of law and fact must be indulged in favor of legality. Moore v. RLCC Technologies,  Inc., 95-2627 (La. 2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1135; Faul v. Trahan, 98-488 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/7/98),  718 So.2d 1081, 1087. The presumption is especially forceful in the case of statutes enacted to  promote a public purpose.4 Polk, et al v. Edwards, et al., 626 So.2d 1128, 1132 (La. 1193) (citing  Board of Directors of Louisiana Recovery Dist. v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, etc., 529 So.2d  384, 387 (La. 1988); See also United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 369-70, 59 S.Ct. 551, 555,  83 L.Ed. 763 (1939). The legislature is given great deference in the judicial determination of a  

  

4 Act 322 was enacted to change the prescriptive periods for civil actions against a person: (1) for sexual abuse  committed against a minor; or (2) convicted of a crime against the child, so that these actions do not prescribe. 

statute’s constitutionality, and legislators are presumed to have weighed the relevant constitutional  considerations in enacting legislation. Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission v. Olivier,  04-2147 (La. 1/19/05), 892 So.2d 570, 573. 

Because a state statute is presumed constitutional, the party challenging the statute bears  the burden of proving it is unconstitutional. State v. Brenan, 99-2291 (La. 5/16/00), 772 So.2d 64,  67. The burden defendants carry in challenging the constitutionality of a statute is a heavy burden.  It is not enough for a person challenging a statute to show that its constitutionality is fairly  debatable; it must be shown clearly and convincingly that it was the constitutional aim to deny the  legislature the power to enact the statute. Hite v. Larpenter, 04-1821 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/23/05),  923 So.2d 140, 145, writ denied, 05-2255 (La. 3/10/06), 925 So.2d 511; see also La. Const. art. I,  § 1; Swift v. State, 342 So.2d 191, 194 (La.1977). To successfully challenge a legislative act as  unconstitutional on its face, the challenger must establish that no circumstances exist under which  the act would be valid. City of New Orleans v. La. Assessors’ Retirement & Relief Fund, 2005- 2548 (La. 10/1/07), 986 So.2d 1, 2-3. 

The legislature, elected by the state’s citizenry, may enact any legislation that the  Constitution does not explicitly prohibit; thus, the legislature has all powers that have not been  denied it by the Constitution. In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So.2d 367, 373 (La. 1991). Unlike the federal government, which has only those powers which are granted to it  by the state, the Louisiana Legislature has all powers which have not been denied it by the state  constitution. Bd. of Dirs. of the La. Recovery Dist. v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, & Citizens  of La., 529 So.2d 384, 387 (La. 1988); Bd. of Comm’rs v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d  281, 286 (La. 1986). The legislature’s powers are derived from the citizens of the state who freely  elect their legislative representatives; alternatively stated, the provisions of the Louisiana  Constitution serve as limitation on the otherwise plenary power exercised by the legislature, which  may enact any legislation not prohibited by the Constitution. Polk, 626 So.2d at 1132 (citing State  Bond Comm’n of the State of La. v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners & Citizens, 525 So.2d 521  (La. 1988)). Thus, in order to hold legislation invalid under the Constitution, it is necessary to rely  on some particular constitutional provision that limits the legislature’s power. Polk, 626 So.2d at  1132 (citing In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So.2d 367 (La. 1991)).

The party challenging a statute’s constitutionality bears the burden of clearly proving the  legislation is invalid or unconstitutional. Specifically, the party must rely upon a constitutional  provision that restricts the legislature’s authority to enact the particular legislation and must  establish that the legislation is barred by such provision. Id.; see also State Bond Comm’n, 525  So.2d at 525. Any doubt as to the legislation’s constitutionality must be resolved in favor of  constitutionality. Bd. of Directors of La. Recovery District, 529 So.2d at 387-388. 

Because of the presumption of constitutionality in determining the validity of a  constitutional challenge, a court “must construe a statute so as to preserve its constitutionality  when it is reasonable to do so.” M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 998 So.2d at 31. In  addition, when deciding whether a particular legislative enactment is unconstitutional, this Court  has repeatedly stated that it is not the court’s “duty to determine the wisdom behind the enactment  of [the] legislation.” M.J. Farms, 998 So.2d at 34. Thus, so-called “policy considerations” are not  relevant to the decision, as such considerations are more appropriately presented to the legislature,  in the first instance, when the pros and cons of a proposed law are being debated. M.J. Farms, 998  So.2d at 34. Lastly, “[u]ntil an act of the Legislature is declared unconstitutional by the final  decisions of the courts, its provisions must be respected and obeyed.” State ex rel. Porterie v.  Jones, 159 So. 594, 598 (La. 1935). 

  1. Courts should only decide constitutional challenges when required to do so. 

The presumption in favor of the validity of state laws, the heavy burden of proof, and the  deference required to be given to the legislature all speak to the fact that the constitutionality of  state laws is not an issue that a court can approach lightly; rather, it is an issue of grave  constitutional significance which the courts address and decide only where it is properly raised  and movers have carried their heavy burden of proof.  

Although this court generally possesses the power and authority to decide the  constitutionality of the provisions challenged in defendants’ second peremptory exception of  prescription, it is required to decide a constitutional issue only “if the procedural posture of the  case and the relief sought by the appellant demand that [it] do so.” State v. Mercadel, 2003-3015  (La. 5/25/04), 874 So.2d 829, 834 (citing Ring v. State, DOTD, 2002-1367 (La. 1/4/03), 835 So.2d  423, 428). Stated another way, courts do not generally reach or determine constitutional issues  unless, in the context of a particular case, the resolution of such issues is necessary to decide the 

case. White v. West Carroll Hospital, Inc., 613 So.2d 150, 157 (La.1992). In fact, “[f]or well over  a century, the [Supreme Court] has consistently refrained from entertaining questions as to the  constitutionality of laws except where that determination is essential to the decision.” Edwards v.  Legislature, 20-1407 (La. 12/21/20), 315 So.3d 213, 215.  

The Office of the Attorney General notes that Mr. Doe has alleged that his cause of action  has not prescribed under various theories other than pursuant to the revival provision of Act 322. In addition, defendants have alleged that Act 322 does not apply to them for various reasons. Thus,  it is the position of this office that it is not necessary to reach the resolution of the constitutional  issues.  

III. ACT 322 DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. 

Act 322 amended and reenacted La. R.S. 9:2800.9(A) so that it now provides: 

A.(1) An action against a person for sexual abuse of a minor, or for physical abuse  of a minor resulting in permanent impairment or permanent physical injury or  scarring, does not prescribe. 

(2) An action against a person convicted of a crime against the child does not  prescribe and may be filed at any time following conviction. “Crime against the  child” has the same meaning as provided in Children’s Code Article 603. 

In addition, Section 2 of Act 322 provides: 

Section 2. For a period of three years following the effective date of this Act, any  party whose action under R.S. 9:2800.9 was barred by liberative prescription prior  to the effective date of this Act shall be permitted to file an action under R.S.  9:2800.9 against a party whose alleged actions are the subject of R.S. 9:2800.9. It  is the intent of the legislature to revive for a period of three years any claim  against a party, authorized by R.S. 9:2800.9, that prescribed prior to the  effective date of this Act. (emphasis added.) 

  1. Act 322 provides a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to  revive prescribed causes of action. 

Jesuit contends that the revival clause violates due process because it deprives them of a  vested right. However, this argument is without merit. 

In Chance v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 93-2582 (La. 4/11/94), 635 So.2d 177, the  Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the retroactive application referred to in La. C.C.  art. 6 extends to revive previously time-barred causes of action. In that case, the court stated: 

Although prescriptive statutes are generally procedural in nature, the revival of an  already prescribed claim presents additional concerns. For while the defendant does  not acquire anything during the running of the prescriptive period, once the time  period has elapsed, the legislature grants the defendant the right to plead the  exception of prescription in order to defeat the plaintiffs claim. La.Code Civ.P. arts.  927 & 934. Because the defendant acquires the right to plead the exception of  prescription, a change in that right constitutes a substantive change in the law as  applied to the defendant. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So.2d  809, 817 (La.1992) (“Substantive laws either establish new rules, rights, and duties  or change existing ones.”); Thomassie v. Savoie, 581 So.2d 1031, 1034 (La. App. 

1st Cir.1991) (“[I]f a statute which is remedial or procedural also has the effect of  making a change in the substantive law, it must be construed to operate  prospectively only.”). Thus, were we to interpret the amendment at issue to allow  the revival of prescribed causes of action, the substantive rights of the defendant  would be materially changed because he would be stripped of this acquired defense.  Guided by the principles established in [La.C.C.] article 6 [which provides that  substantive laws apply prospectively only], we require, at the very least, a clear and  unequivocal expression of intent by the legislature for such an “extreme exercise of  legislative power.” (Footnote omitted.) 

Chance, 635 So.2d at 178. 

Likewise in Cameron Parish School Bd. v. AC and S, Inc., 96-0895 (La. 1/14/1997), 687  So.2d 84, the Supreme Court again considered the issue of the revival of a previously prescribed  claim and employed the Chance analysis. Although the court noted that the legislature directed  that the statute in question was to apply to “any action,” the court found: 

[L]iberal use by the legislature of the word or phrases “action,” “any action,” “all  actions,” and “any and all actions” in these prescriptive statutes supportive of our  determination that the legislature, in using such wording in the statute at issue  herein, has not clearly and unequivocally expressed an intent to revive an already  prescribed cause of action…. 

… 

[T]he language used in the statute does not contain any reference to revival of  prescribed claims. Moreover, the legislative history of this statute gives no  indication of any intent on the part of the legislature that this statute should apply  to revive causes of action which had already prescribed under the law existing prior  to the statute’s enactment. 

Cameron Parish School Board, 687 So.2d at 91. 

Unlike the provisions in Chance and Cameron Parish School Board, Act 322 has a clear  and unequivocal expression of legislative intent that the amendment to La. R.S. 9:2800.9 should  act to revive causes of action which had already prescribed under the law existing prior to the  statute’s enactment. Moreover, the legislative history attached to Jesuit’s memorandum as Exhibit  A further supports this interpretation. Given the clear expression of legislative will, the great  deference afforded to the legislature in these matters,5and the analysis in Chance and its progeny,  the Office of the Attorney General submits that the revival provision is constitutional. 

  1. The revival clause of Act 322 does not violate substantive due process. 

Substantive due process may be broadly defined as the constitutional guarantee that no  person shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life, liberty, or property. The essence of substantive due  process is protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action. Babineaux v. Judiciary Comm’n, 341  So. 2d 396, 400 (La. 1976). The first step in the analysis of a claimed substantive due process  

  

5In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So.2d 367, 373 (La. 1991).

violation is the determination whether there is a property or liberty interest that is being infringed  upon. This court has held that, in order to prove a violation of substantive due process, a party must first establish the existence of a constitutionally-protected property or liberty interest. State  v. Bazile, 2012-2243 (La. 5/7/13), 144 So.3d 719, 730; Oliver v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 2014- 0329, 2014-0330 (La. 10/31/14), 156 So.3d 596, 629-30. 

Jesuit argues that the revival clause would deprive it of a vested right to defend itself against  a claim by the running of prescription. See Falgout v. Dealers Truck Equip. Co., 98-3150 (La.  10/19/99), 748 So.2d 399, 407. However, even assuming that the revival clause would deprive  Jesuit of a vested right, the inquiry does not stop there. 

The court must next turn to whether Jesuit’s substantive due process rights were violated.  Assuming for the sake of argument that Jesuit has established the existence of a constitutionally  protected property or liberty interest, a violation of substantive due process still requires arbitrary  and capricious conduct by the governing authority. Coxe Property Management and Leasing v.  City of New Orleans, 2019-0911 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/8/20), 294 So.3d 1098, 1104 (citing Boudreaux  v. Larpenter, 2011-0410 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/11/12). 110 So.3d 159, 170. Government action  comports with substantive due process if the action is rationally related to a legitimate  governmental interest.” Id. 

Louisiana has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens who were sexually abused as  minors and in providing them with the ability to seek redress in the courts. A small window of  time allowing for a revival of actions that had prescribed is rationally related to this legitimate  governmental interest. The legislature is the body that had originally set the prescriptive period, 

and it is within the power of the legislature to change that prescriptive period. Thus, the  legislature’s action is not arbitrary and capricious and does not violate substantive due process. 

  1. THE REVIVAL OF THE PRESCRIBED CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS  DOES NOT VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST BILLS  OF ATTAINDER. 

The United States Constitution prohibits state legislatures from enacting bills of attainder.6 Jesuit argues that the revival of the prescribed claims would constitute an unconstitutional bill of  attainder. 

  

6 U.S. Const. art. I § 10; see also La. Const. art. I, § 23.

The United States Supreme Court has defined such bills as “legislative acts, no matter what  their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in  such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial….” United States v. Brown, 381  U.S. 437, 448-49, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1715, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). The revival clause does not meet  this definition. It does not apply to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a  group; rather, it applies to anyone who has engaged in the proscribed conduct. In addition, it does  not apply punishment without a judicial trial. Indeed, it does not apply any punishment at all. Even  if it revives a cause of action that had prescribed, the plaintiff must still prove his or her case  against the defendant before any damages can be assessed. Thus, Jesuit’s argument is without  merit. 

CONCLUSION 

In the instant matter, the Attorney General urges this court to decline to hear the issue of  constitutionality of Act 322, as it does not comport with jurisprudential requirements or statutory  requirements for bringing a constitutional challenge. Jesuit has failed to meet the heavy burden  necessary to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, Act 322 and La. 9:2800.9  should be upheld. 

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